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What determines electoral results in post-conflict societies? Are elections decided by the voters’ 
experiences and perceptions of the ended conflict? Or are they perhaps decided by the voters’ 
considerations of the political parties’ peacetime economic platforms and performance in office? In 
other words, to which extent are electoral results determined by the war past as opposed to the 
peacetime present and future? 
In the processes of democratization and consolidation that post-conflict societies usually go 
through, establishing a functioning system of signaling and accountability between the political elites 
and the electorate is of critical importance. However, even though the relationship between 
democratization, elections, and conflict has garnered much attention in the literature over the past 
two decades, it seems that we are still lacking answers to the previously posed questions. We know, 
for example, that democratization and elections can lead to armed conflicts (Snyder, 2000; 
Cederman, Hug, & Krebs, 2010), just as we know a great deal about a number of aspects of post-
conflict electoral processes: from their complex relationship with democratic consolidation to the 
ambiguous role of the international community in their promotion and implementation (Paris, 2004; 
Dunning, 2011). Apart from prima facie or merely anecdotal evidence about the lasting power of 
ethnic appeals in ethnically diverse post-conflict societies, however, we have a limited 
understanding of what forms the foundations of voters’ electoral choices during the times of post-
conflict recovery. 
This study offers a step in improving that understanding through the analysis of the effects 
of the legacy of war and economic factors on the pattern of electoral results during more than a 
decade of post-conflict political competition in the newest EU member state – Croatia. Croatia 
experienced a difficult post-communist economic transition while fighting for its independence from 
the former Yugoslavia and later for its full sovereignty in a bitter five-year war (1991-1995). Our 
analysis is based on an original dataset which is comprised of a series of economic and socio-
demographic variables, as well as electoral results for Croatia’s five post-war elections (2000, 2003, 
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2007, 2011, 2015) – all collected on the level of more than 500 municipalities. Croatia is a perfect 
object of study not only because of its recent past or the availability of data uncharacteristic of most 
post-conflict states, but also because of the stability and the nature of its democratic and electoral 
institutions during the period under our attention. Its electoral system of proportional 
representation in relatively large multi-member districts with full control of central party leaderships 
over nomination procedures is arguably ideal from the standpoint of establishing the incumbent 
parties’ clarity of responsibility (Powell & Whitten, 1993). Our dataset and Croatia’s institutional 
setup, therefore, enable us to trace the evolution of the pattern of electoral support during five 
electoral cycles, and allow us to draw lessons about the relationship of war legacy, the economy, and 
electoral results without the interference of institutional volatility often present in post-conflict 
societies. 
In the universe of states recovering from painful experiences of war, the nearly monoethnic 
post-war Croatia was perhaps uniquely positioned to leave the legacy of violence in the past. Yet the 
results of our analysis paint a troubling picture of a polity primarily riven by its communities’ starkly 
different experiences of the war rather than by any economic factors. Croatian voters can and do 
vote the incumbents out of office, which means they do change their preferences from election to 
election. Moreover – at least judging by the electoral results on the national level – their preferences 
are likely influenced by the economy. The underlying pattern of electoral support, however, 
demonstrates that political competition is heavily constrained by the legacy of the war for 
independence. In fact, our analysis shows the legacy of war to be the single strongest determinant of 
the pattern of voting. Communities that suffered more in the war disproportionally support the 
center-right party that took the country into independence and led it throughout the war. Moreover, 
this tendency exhibits little sign of abating over time – which suggests that the communities’ 
experiences of the war have become embedded into their political choices. In many ways, this deep 
social and political rift seems to have become a form of a nation-building cleavage in the sense put 
forward by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and later expanded to post-communist Eastern Europe by 
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Evans and Whitefield (1993). This raises serious concerns about the nature of social recovery in post-
conflict polities and the perpetuation of conflict dynamics through democratic competition, even in 
states as ethnically uniform as Croatia. 
 
2. Post-conflict elections and post-communist economic voting 
Wars leave lasting imprints on the affected societies. The cessation of hostilities often only marks 
the beginning of a lengthy and difficult healing process characterized by scarcely better quality of life 
and lingering danger of reversal back into violence. Time, however, does heal wounds. People and 
their societies do move on. Their concerns increasingly turn toward matters related to the 
peacetime present and future, rather than to wartime past. For Tony Judt (2007: 236), one sign that 
post-1945 European publics left World War II in the past was “the way in which economics displaced 
politics as the goal and language of collective action.” Indeed, there is something fundamentally 
different in the political lives of post-conflict societies that have left their wars in the past, as 
opposed to those that have not. Like Judt, we believe economics is at the heart of that difference. 
Political competition in societies that have successfully transitioned into peacetime is usually 
centered on the economy. This is the reason why the analysis presented in this study focusses on the 
relationship of war legacy, the economy, and electoral competition. Literatures on post-conflict 
elections and (peacetime) economic voting have developed without much contact. Nevertheless, 
they are essential in helping us understand electoral dynamics in a post-conflict polity like Croatia. 
 
2.1 Post-conflict elections: Beyond democratization and ethnicity 
At the risk of oversimplification, we can say that research on conflict and elections generally comes 
in two forms: that which examines the impact of democratization and elections on the onset of 
violence, and that which examines the role of elections in post-conflict recovery. Both of these 
research strands have been strongly dominated by considerations of inter-ethnic relations, which is 
not surprising given the nature of conflicts that have captured the world’s attention over the past 
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two decades. The question of ethnic divisions has, therefore, crucially informed most research 
efforts dealing with the relationship between conflict and voting – from the impact of 
democratization on ethnically complex societies (Mann, 2005) to the role of different types of 
electoral systems in bridging inter-ethnic divisions (Lijphart, 1977; Reilly, 2001). When it comes to 
actual voter choices in post-conflict societies, however, research results have been largely case-
specific and ultimately inconclusive (Lyons, 2002), possibly due to the fact that most studies have 
offered merely descriptive accounts of single elections and their national level results. Thus, for 
example, we have the Cambodian voters opting for moderates in the Constituent Assembly elections 
of 1993, but we also have the voters in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first post-war elections of 1996 
electing the ethnically-based parties which had precipitated the war (Manning, 2004). 
Far more significant progress has been made in the study of the effects of exposure to 
conflict violence – in the form of combat casualties – on the level of support for war and for 
incumbents responsible for the conduct of war in the US context. Studies with counties or 
congressional districts as units of analysis have shown that combat casualties can have a significant 
impact on the incumbents’ electoral fortunes – from the Civil War (Carson et al. 2001) through the 
Vietnam War (Gartner et al. 1997) to the Second Iraq War (Karol and Miguel 2007). The principal line 
of contention in this literature concerns the question of the relationship between casualty tolerance 
and war outcome, i.e. voters rewarding or punishing incumbents based on whether they are winning 
or losing the war (Klarevas et al. 2006). Generally speaking, however, incumbents seem to fare 
worse electorally in communities which have experienced higher levels of war casualties. The 
question that hovers over this line of research in US politics, however, is to which extent these 
effects are lasting, with some evidence suggesting they are very short-lived (Althaus et al. 2012). 
When it comes to individual-level studies in this literature, what stands out are the findings that 
voters respond strongly to the geographic and the socioeconomic distribution of casualties, i.e. they 
assign greater value to local, as opposed to national, casualties and they show aversion to the 
socioeconomic inequality among combat fatalities (Kriner and Shen 2012, 2014). In other words, 
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voters’ political preference formation when it comes to the conduct of war is heavily dependent on 
social context. 
As insightful as this literature on war and voter choice in the US setting is, however, its utility 
for our understanding of political competition in post-war societies which have experienced the full 
fury of war destruction first-hand is limited. Wars in Vietnam or Iraq have of course had a dramatic 
impact on American society, but the United States has not experienced war on its own soil for a 
century and a half. One line of inquiry in the body of research on the impact of full social exposure to 
war violence does offer promise in improving our understanding of democratic competition in post-
conflict polities. Survey research – particularly from former Yugoslavia – has suggested that while 
individual experiences of war violence carry little predictive power in explaining one's future 
nationalism or ethnic prejudice, contextual experiences of violence can help explain the 
development of these sentiments (Massey, Hodson, & Sekulić, 2003; Strabac & Ringdal, 2008; 
Dyrstad, 2012). Living in areas exposed to violence can make one more prone to hold nationalist or 
ethnically prejudiced viewpoints – finding that could be seen as in contrast to the findings in the US 
context. We still, however, lack systematic understanding of whether those nationalist sentiments 
translate into actual votes and how the pattern of these votes evolves over time, particularly in post-
conflict societies that are not riven by ethnic divisions. In other words, what is a half-life of conflict-
induced nationalist sentiments and do these sentiments even matter when it comes to actual 
electoral competition? From the standpoint of theory, there is little that could help us answer these 
questions. Common sense, however, would suggest that these sentiments should be electorally 
salient, but also that they should fade together with the memories of conflict and violence. 
 
2.2 Post-communist economic voting: Partisanship and incumbency  
Research literature on the interaction of economic performance and elections, on the other hand, 
has a much longer tradition and offers far more insights. This literature was inspired by Kramer’s 
(1971) seminal contribution which pushed researchers to model voter choice from a rational utility 
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maximization perspective, where voters compare expected utilities for different candidates based on 
their economic well-being. It was the centerpiece of reasoning for the so-called responsibility (or 
incumbency) hypothesis, with voters punishing or rewarding incumbents depending on their 
economic performance. Subsequent empirical and theoretical research has largely confirmed the 
incumbency hypothesis in the US, while also finding considerable heterogeneity in voter responses 
to economic performance in other Western democracies, most likely due to differences in their 
institutional contexts which can present voters with difficulties in assigning responsibility. Nannestad 
and Paldam (1994), Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000), and more recently Duch and Stevenson (2008) 
have summarized the principal findings of this continuously expanding literature from the past forty 
years. 
When it comes to empirical literature on economic voting in post-communist Eastern 
Europe, which is of particular interest for our analysis, we can say that it suffers from the same 
cross-country heterogeneity present in non-US-based studies of Western democracies. A number of 
studies have found support for the traditional incumbency hypothesis (Duch, 1995; Mishler & Rose, 
1996; Przeworski, 1996; Markowski & Toka, 1998; Duch, 2001; Anderson, Lewis-Beck, & Stegmaier, 
2003). However, an equally large number of studies have found that the relationship between 
economic conditions and voting depends more on party type and a range of other factors than on 
incumbent performance (Pacek, 1994; Powers & Cox, 1997; Harper, 2000; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tucker, 
2006). In the context of Western consolidated democracies, these partisanship-based arguments 
have largely centered on unemployment and inflation (Hibbs, 1977; Kiewiet, 1983). In studies 
dealing with post-communist Eastern Europe, however, transitional reforms took center stage: 
voters supposedly rewarded or punished parties with reform and anti-reform agendas irrespective 
of their governing status. 
The most comprehensive research on this topic has been conducted by Tucker (2006) who 
found that during the first decade after the fall of communism East European parties associated with 
the new regime were rewarded when the economy was doing well and punished when it was doing 
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poorly; whereas the opposite was true of the old regime parties – all regardless of whether these 
parties were in government or not. Subsequent research, however, has shown that Tucker’s 
“transitional identity model”, while convincing for the 1990s, will likely lose its relevance together 
with the loss of relevance of the communist past and the experiences of early transition (Roberts, 
2008).  Whatever the actual economic drivers of East European voters’ electoral decision making 
may be, it appears safe to conclude that economic voting in the region is increasing over time as 
voters gain more information and as they become better acclimated to the democratic process 
(Duch, 2001; Roberts, 2008). In other words, with the passage of time we can expect the economy – 
whether through partisanship or incumbency – to become more important as a determinant of 
electoral fortunes in post-communist polities. 
 
3. Deriving hypotheses in the Croatian context 
Croatia – just like the rest of the Balkans – has been largely neglected by most studies of voting and 
social cleavages in post-communist Eastern Europe (Tucker, 2002). This is to some extent the case 
due to Western perceptions of the quality of Croatia’s democracy during the rule of Franjo Tuđman’s 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in the 1990s, which was commonly considered as a form of 
“authoritarian populism” or “democratic despotism” (Jou, 2010). Part of the problem also lay in the 
fact that scholars considered political competition in the region to be of secondary importance to 
the issues of war conduct and post-war reconstruction and reconciliation. Croatia, however, did not 
garner much attention even after the democratic changes that followed the HDZ defeat in the first 
truly post-war parliamentary elections of January 2000. In expectation of that defeat at the hands of 
the Center-Left Coalition led by the reformed communists in the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the 
HDZ made one final change in the electoral rules – from a mixed system to pure proportional 
representation. Croatia thus entered into what was popularly termed its “Second Republic” – a form 
of partitocrazia with relatively stable electoral competitors coalesced around the HDZ on the right 
and the SDP on the left, coalition governments, and strong – if bumpy – process of Europeanization 
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on the road to EU membership. In other words, Croatia became the perfect case for the analysis of 
elections and voting, and yet there have been only a few studies that have gone beyond mere 
description of the main campaign issues. Moreover, the research aims of these studies were limited 
to establishing the correlates of left-right identification from survey data – and only for the period up 
to 2003 (Zakošek, 1994; Bagić, 2007; Jou, 2010). Their findings fit the general post-communist 
pattern with the more educated, urban, nonreligious, and tolerant voters tending to favor the left. 
 Curiously, none of these studies dealt with Croatia’s recent war past as a source of political 
differentiation in spite of the fact that the 1991-1995 war for independence remained a salient 
political issue from its end until today. The war has been at the forefront of Croatian politics 
primarily due to stark policy differences between the two principal political camps regarding: 1) the 
work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and 2) the state benefits 
given to the war veterans. The issue of Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY was in fact key to the 
mid-term shakedown of the governing Center-Left Coalition in March 2002 and the collapse of its 
second-largest member, the Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS) (Kasapović, 2003). It also decisively 
contributed to the electoral victory of the HDZ in 2003. Throughout this period, the Social Democrats 
consistently argued for cooperation with the Tribunal, whereas the HDZ vocally criticized the work of 
the Tribunal’s Office of the Prosecutor as criminalizing Croatia’s legitimate defense efforts. The HDZ, 
however, cooperated extensively with the Tribunal while in government in the period between 2003 
and 2011 in an effort to secure Croatia’s membership in the EU (Subotić, 2009). The issue of the ICTY 
arguably ended only in November 2012 with the successful appeal and acquittal of Croatian general 
Ante Gotovina, whose case was publicly perceived as paradigmatic in the legal battle of the Croatian 
government with the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor. 
When it comes to state benefits for war veterans, this issue has been a prominent campaign 
topic from 2000 onward. The HDZ proactively increased veteran pensions and other benefits. It also 
lowered standards for the attainment of veteran status. The SDP and its coalition partners, on the 
other hand, repeatedly called for the revision of all veteran benefits and the publication of the 
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registry of war veterans as a form of public pressure on potential abusers of the system. These policy 
differences have turned into an emotional battle of symbols with both sides lowering the tenor of 
political discourse, though the bulk of responsibility for that lies squarely with the HDZ which has 
repeatedly tried to portray its rivals as “Yugo-nostalgic” and unpatriotic.1 
Considering the dearth of studies on the patterns of voting in Croatia, the limitations of 
research on post-conflict elections, and the abundance of often-conflicting findings in the literature 
on economic foundations of voter choice in post-communist Eastern Europe – identifying testable 
hypotheses may appear difficult. We nevertheless propose three rather straightforward 
suppositions. The principal goal of this study is centered on the evolution of the legacy of conflict 
and economic performance as determinants of electoral support. Research on the effects of 
communities’ exposure to war violence on their political loyalties in the US context has found that 
greater casualties generally lead to electoral losses for the incumbents responsible for war conduct. 
Crucially, however, it remains questionable to which extent this relationship is conditional on war 
outcome. On the other hand, past survey research in the post-Yugoslav context has found a positive 
relationship between the contextual experiences of war and nationalist sentiment. Our first 
hypothesis is therefore that the intensity of the community’s experience of war has a positive effect 
on the electoral fortunes of the HDZ as the main party of the center-right and the party that led 
Croatia into independence and throughout the war. We are here primarily guided by the survey 
findings from the region and the post-war policies of the principal players, but also by the fact that 
Croatia’s war for independence was ultimately victorious. Our second hypothesis, however, is that 
this connection between communities’ exposure to war and their political loyalties weakens over 
time, as the memories and real consequences of the war fade. 
When it comes to the influence of the economy on the pattern of electoral results, we are 
interested in establishing the relative utility of various partisanship hypotheses vis-à-vis the classical 
incumbency argument, particularly in light of recent challenges to the traditional left-right 
distinction in the East European context (Tavits & Letki, 2009). In this debate, however, we consider 
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ourselves agnostic, as it appears equally sensible to us to perceive Croatian voters as sensitive to 
incumbents’ economic performance or to their proclaimed economic policy preferences. Crucially, 
however, our third hypothesis is that the economy – in whichever form – features more prominently 
as a determinant of the pattern of voting in more recent electoral cycles. Put simply, the essence of 
our expectation is that the electoral relevance of the economy increases over time in tandem with 
the decrease in the electoral relevance of the legacy of war. 
 
4. Data and methods 
Our analysis is based on a comprehensive set of electoral, economic, and socio-demographic 
variables collected on the level of Croatia’s municipalities for the parliamentary contests of 2000, 
2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015. Although most of the empirical literature dealing with similar issues has 
focused on survey data – a methodological choice extensively and cogently defended by Duch and 
Stevenson (2008) – we opted to rely on aggregate figures due to their greater reliability, objectivity, 
and availability which allowed us to cover the whole of Croatia with easily comparable data over five 
electoral cycles. 
Our dependent variable     is, thus, the total vote share principal electoral competitors 
received on the municipal level. Since vote share is calculated as a proportional variable distributed 
on a unit interval (0, 1), this disabled us from using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method since 
proportional data are not normally distributed, and since it would violate the linearity assumptions 
of the conditional expectation function. Instead we employ the fractional logit model – a generalized 
linear model with a Bernoulli quasi-likelihood specification (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996).2 This 
approach is attractive since it requires no transformations of data at the extreme values of zero or 
one. Moreover, we found that it provides the best fit for our model, considering the distribution of 
the dependent variables.3 We use the quasi-likelihood approach to estimate the following non-linear 
model: 
 (  |  )=  (   ) 
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Where  (∙) is the logistic link function satisfying 0 <  ( )< 1,∀  ∈ ℝ , which ensures that the 
predicted values of     lie in the interval (0,1) and can even take on the extreme values of 0 and 1.    
is a vector of covariates, while   is a vector of regression parameters. The Bernoulli log-likelihood 
function necessary for the estimation of the parameters is thus: 
  ( )=    log[ (   )]+ (1−   )log[1−  (   )] 
which is well defined for 0 <  (∙)< 1. Papke and Wooldridge (1996: 621-623) discuss in detail the 
advantages of using this approach, particularly regarding the relative efficiency of quasi maximum 
likelihood estimation, and its greater robustness in estimating standard errors when compared to 
the standard quasi-likelihood framework. We applied this method using the statistical software 
STATA, where we estimated a standard generalized linear model with a logit link function, a binomial 
distribution family and a robust option for standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. 
Since the primary geographic units of analysis in our dataset are Croatia’s municipalities, all 
of our data were collected on the municipal level by merging and adapting the datasets of four 
institutions: Croatia’s Electoral Commission (DIP), Croatian Employment Service (HZZ), Tax 
Administration (Porezna uprava), and the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (DZS). In the period under our 
scrutiny, the number of municipalities remained stable – rising slightly from 546 in 2000 to 556 in 
2015 through splits in several smaller provincial municipalities, which we adjusted for in our 
calculations. 
During the same period, Croatia’s PR electoral rules also remained virtually unchanged, with 
voters casing their votes for electoral lists in ten districts of similar size, each returning 14 MPs 
(Odbor za zakonodavstvo, 2015).4 Croatia’s Electoral Commission provided us with the tally of votes 
for all five parliamentary elections broken down by municipality. The Croatian Democratic Union 
won the 2003 and 2007 elections; the Center-Left Coalition – which took slightly different forms over 
the years, though it was always led by the Social Democratic Party – won the electoral contests in 
2000 and 2011; while the 2015 election was for all intents and purposes a draw, ultimately decided 
by the protest party Most (“The Bridge”) which formed a coalition government with the HDZ after 
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lengthy negotiations.5 We believe that our focus on the HDZ and the Center-Left Coalition is justified 
since these two players consistently won between two thirds and four fifths of total votes cast, as 
well as about 90% of parliamentary seats. They also controlled the vast majority of ministries in 
Croatia’s seven governments formed during this period. 
When it comes to our independent variables, we operationalized the incumbents’ economic 
performance through Unemployment, Income (log), and Income Δ. We opted for these variables 
because we believe they best capture the living standards and the state of the economy in a given 
community, particularly in the East European context that has been shown to be acutely sensitive to 
issues of unemployment and workers’ salaries.  The variable Unemployment, thus, represents the 
average monthly unemployment rate in the election year; Income (log) represents real monthly per 
capita net income in Croatian kunas in the election year (deflated to the 2010 level using official DZS 
inflation figures); and Income Δ represents percentage change in average real monthly per capita net 
income in the election year compared to the previous year.6 Unfortunately, the data provided by the 
Tax Administration was limited to the period 1999-2014, so we could not include Income Δ in our 
analysis of the 2000 election and the income data in the analysis of the 2015 election is lagged by 
one year. 
Capturing the effects of Croatia’s 1991-1995 war for independence proved to be much more 
challenging, considering the absence of casualty figures on the municipal level. The effects of the 
war manifested themselves in a variety of ways, whether as human loss, torn social fabric, 
destruction of economic potential, difficulties with the reintegration of war veterans, or the 
challenges of confronting unpleasant facts about the conduct of war operations by the Croatian 
armed forces – factors often difficult or impossible to measure.7 The 2001 census, however, offered 
one possibility to capture the effects of actual war violence on individual municipalities: Croatian 
Bureau of Statistics counted the number of disabled persons on the municipal level and sorted them 
by cause of disability – one of the causes being the 1991-1995 war. This became our variable War 
disabled per ‘000. It is important to note that the DZS included in these figures both civilians and 
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soldiers irrespective of their ethnicity or the side on which they fought. However, judging by the 
figures and considering the flight of more than half of the pre-war population of the Croatian Serbs 
(and their modest return by 2001, in contrast to the solid return of Croatian refugees to their homes 
in the previously occupied areas), it is safe to assume that this variable primarily includes Croat 
civilians and those who fought on the side of the Croatian government. 
Figure 1 provides four highly indicative maps of Croatian municipalities showing the electoral 
results of the HDZ and the Center-Left Coalition in the 2000 election, the average unemployment 
rate in that electoral year, and the war disability figures from the 2001 census. The map showing 
disability figures demonstrates that this variable closely follows the path of the war’s destruction 
and is highest in the frontline areas of direct combat. It ranges from virtually zero in the west, which 
was largely unaffected by war, to the twenties and thirties in the battlefield regions of central 
Croatia and the high of 65 in the municipality of Vukovar on the border with Serbia. We thus find it 
to be a reasonably reliable proxy for the impact of war on the local communities. Here we should say 
that the shape or pattern of war was to some extent endogenous, but to a larger and far more 
important extent exogenous (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002; Barić, 2005; Marijan, 2008). The 
destruction and the frontlines in the earliest stage of the war were principally determined by the 
invasion plan of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Later they were determined by the plan of the 
Belgrade regime of Slobodan Milošević regarding the annexation of Croatia’s territory, which was 
largely guided by the share of Serbs in the pre-war local population. In other words, the pattern of 
war destruction had little to do with pre-war political orientations of the affected population.8 
[Figure 1 near here] 
When it comes to our control variables, we include eight socio-demographic measures 
commonly identified in the literature as relevant, as well as dummy variables for Croatia’s historical 
regions (Dalmatia, Slavonia, Istria, and Central Croatia). The detailed description of these variables is 
in the online appendix Table A. Our non-linear model in terms of variables used is, therefore, defined 
as: 
Glaurdić and Vuković – Voting After War 
14 
 
 (    |  )=  (   +          +           +   ∆        +        +     ) 
Where  (∙) is the logistic link function, and    is the vector of our control variables. We test for 
possible problems of multicollinearity by computing variance inflation factors (VIF) for all 
independent variables in the five electoral cycles and find none of them exceeding 5 (with the mean 
values of about 2.5), let alone the maximum recommended value of 10 (Marquardt, 1970). Here we 
should particularly note that the correlation between Unemployment and War disabled, as well as 
between Income (log) and War disabled, was remarkably low and stable for the five electoral cycles 
and was on average 0.31 and -0.02 respectively. In other words, exposure to war violence and 
destruction was not automatically related to lower levels of economic performance. 
 
5. Results: Economy vs. war legacy in voting patterns 
The results of our analysis are displayed in Table 1, with each column representing the full model for 
one of the two principal electoral competitors in a given election year. The table reports average 
marginal effects instead of the usual log-odds ratios obtained by the maximum likelihood estimation 
method. The reason for this choice was primarily easier and more useful interpretation. The 
marginal effect of an independent variable    is the partial derivative of the predicted value   with 
respect to   , holding all other covariates constant. Angrist and Pischke (2009: 103) emphasize that 
when using nonlinear models, “their output must be converted into marginal effects to be useful.” 
We can therefore estimate the direct effect each of our explanatory variables has on the predicted 
vote share. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 If we consider Stephen Whitefield’s (2002) useful definition of political cleavages as 
“strongly structured and persistent lines of salient social and ideological division among politically 
important actors,” it is clear from the findings presented in Table 1 that political competition in 
Croatia is indeed set upon the foundations of several very persistent lines of social division. 
Considering the findings from the rest of post-communist Eastern Europe, and considering the fact 
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that our study deals with the second decade of post-communist transition which (at least initially) 
was shown to be less volatile than the first (Tavits, 2005), this is perhaps unsurprising. Our results 
are, however, useful in helping allay the lingering concerns about the level of institutionalization of 
the party system when it comes to long-term organization of programmatically structured political 
conflict (Tiemann, 2012), as it is obvious that the bases of support for the two principal competitors 
exhibit a remarkable dose of stability. Without a doubt, the greatest dose of stability is 
demonstrated by our proxy variable for the effect of the legacy of war on voting patterns. 
Our first hypothesis was that the intensity of the community’s experience of war has a 
positive effect on the electoral fortunes of the HDZ as the main party of the center-right and the 
party that led Croatia into independence and throughout the war. The coefficients for our variable 
War disabled offer unequivocal confirmation of that conclusion. The variable has a consistently 
positive relationship with the vote for the HDZ and a negative relationship with the vote for the 
Center-Left Coalition. Moreover, in all ten cases the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. An increase of one standard deviation in the municipality’s number of war disabled per 1000 
inhabitants (which is equal to 8.1) led to a net gain of the HDZ vis-à-vis the SDP-led coalition of 8.2 
percentage points in 2000, 10.1 in 2003, 9 in 2007, 8.8 in 2011, and 8.7 percentage points in 2015. 
We also present this effect graphically in Figure 2, where the X-axes in all graphs represent the value 
of War disabled, and the Y-axes represent the predicted vote proportions for the HDZ and the 
Center-Left Coalition. The conclusion is self-evident: the past does not seem to fade in post-war 
Croatia. This is a clear contradiction of our second hypothesis, as well as of the literature suggesting 
that the effects of war exposure on political competition are short-lived. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
If the legacy of war exhibits a striking dose of stability in its influence on voting patterns, our 
economic variables seem to paint a more complex picture. Most obviously, unemployment is not 
related to incumbents' performance, but rather seems to be a partisan issue consistently favoring 
the right. In all five elections, Unemployment coefficients are positive for the HDZ and negative for 
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the SDP-led coalition. Seven out of ten times, they are statistically significant.9 Moreover, this 
relationship seems to have become entrenched with the 2007 election. The rise in unemployment by 
one standard deviation in 2007 (9.7%) thus meant a net gain of about 8 percentage points for the 
HDZ in comparison to the Center-Left Coalition. In 2011, a one standard deviation rise in 
unemployment (9.3%) meant a net gain of about 7.3 percentage points for the HDZ. And in 2015, it 
(10.5%) meant net gain of about 7.5 percentage points. These findings are in direct conflict with 
Tucker’s regional-level analysis of Russia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia in the 1990s 
which found the better performing regions going for the parties of the “new regime” (Tucker, 2006). 
They are also in conflict with Tworzecki’s analysis of regional voting patterns in Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic during the first part of that decade which similarly found the depressed regions 
going for the parties of the left (Tworzecki, 2003). 
We believe the reason for this seeming anomaly lies in the actual content of the economic 
policies promoted by the HDZ and the SDP during this period. In line with Tavits and Letki’s (2009) 
finding from the rest of Eastern Europe, it was actually the HDZ that had a more traditionally left-
wing economic platform than the SDP and its liberal partners. To be more specific when it comes to 
employment, this means that the HDZ largely pursued the policy of “stability and job preservation,” 
whereas the SDP promoted the policy of “controlled bankruptcies” (and a resulting, supposedly 
temporary, spike in unemployment) as a means of improving internal liquidity in addition to its 
electoral promises of public spending cuts and threats of engagement with the IMF.10 In other 
words, the economic platform of the HDZ was more socially sensitive than that of the Center-Left 
Coalition, regardless of the fact that both camps have been equally ineffective in increasing the level 
of employment in Croatia while in government. 
Figures for the variable Income (log) are not as straightforward, though they are – as in the 
case of Unemployment – also based on the actual economic platforms of the two principal electoral 
competitors. Particularly notable is the result for the 2007 election when the coefficients were 
positive and significant for the HDZ vote, and negative and significant for the Center-Left vote. We 
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believe this was the product of: 1) the transformation of the HDZ during this period into a more 
centrist conservative party calling for lower taxation, particularly on entrepreneurs (Haughton & 
Fisher, 2008); and 2) the converse electoral campaign choice of the SDP in 2007 to call for increased 
taxation on capital gains, which was primarily directed at the wealthier segments of Croatian society. 
Capital gains tax was, in fact, arguably one of the defining issues of the 2007 electoral contest, with 
the HDZ’s highly effective negative campaign against the SDP’s tax proposals.11 This trend was 
reversed in advance of the 2011 election, with Croatia in dire economic straits and with the HDZ’s 
new leadership, but then revived in 2015 when the ruling SDP campaigned for the introduction of a 
property tax – measure once again directed at wealthier segments of society. In other words, when 
it comes to both income and unemployment, voting patterns seem to suggest that Croatian voters 
are responding to the policy preferences (or promises) of the principal electoral competitors. The 
only difference is that the parties’ policy preferences when it comes to unemployment are more 
stable. 
The figures for income change, on the other hand, seem to tell a more complicated story. 
We should stress here that in our model we tested a series of variables for change in both income 
and unemployment, taking into account the whole mandate of the government or only its last year. 
One of these variables improved our model and thus remained in our analysis: Income Δ. It 
represents percentage change in real monthly per capita net income in the election year compared 
to the year before. The results for the 2003 election are particularly notable here, because they 
appear counterintuitive, at least from the perspective of the incumbency hypothesis. They imply 
that the more a community’s income improved in the year prior to the election – the greater was its 
vote for the HDZ, which was at the time in the opposition. These figures would seem to support 
Tucker’s “transitional identity model” where the party of the “new regime” – and HDZ is of all parties 
most clearly associated with post-communist, independent Croatia – gets rewarded for good 
economic performance regardless of its incumbency status. However, the findings for the remaining 
three electoral cycles could be yet another sign of the “transitional identity model’s” decline in 
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relevance. Of particular note are the findings for the variable Income Δ in 2015, when income growth 
worked in favor of the incumbent Social Democrats.  
Table 1 also offers a wealth of information regarding our control variables, useful in drawing 
conclusions about the more general development of political cleavages in Croatia. Particularly 
notable are the findings regarding: 1) ethnicity (expressed through the variable Croats), which seems 
to have become a salient line of division between the HDZ and the Center-Left Coalition after 2007 
with the increasing participation of Serb refugees and returnees in the electoral process during that 
period; 2) Education, which consistently – and in line with past survey research (Jou, 2010) – favors 
the left; and, most notably, 3) regional divisions, which exhibit a remarkable degree of consistency 
and statistical significance, particularly when it comes to Dalmatia and Istria. Whatever the historical 
or other reasons for this dynamic may be, the implication of our results is that Croatia – just like 
Poland or Ukraine – has a strong regional dimension to the pattern of voting of its citizens. 
As can be seen from the goodness of fit measures reported in Table 1, our variables make up 
a model that possesses solid explanatory power. We applied the usual R-squared statistic and its 
values are in the relatively high range of 0.57 to 0.75. We also performed a likelihood ratio test 
comparing the full model with a nested, intercept model. The statistic obtained approaches a Chi-
squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters 
between the two models. The LR test is calculated using the quasi-log likelihoods obtained by 
performing the maximum likelihood estimation in STATA. In terms of model choice, we used the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to compare the strength 
and fit of models with different variables included. According to AIC and BIC measures, the model 
presented in Table 1 was the best possible from our dataset, which also included several other 
possible control variables. 
 As illuminating as our fractional logit model results are, our original proposition regarding 
the decreasing electoral importance of war legacy and the increasing electoral importance of the 
economy meant that we needed to go a step further and provide a sense of the comparative effect 
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size of all our independent variables. In order to do that, we estimated Eta-squared and partial Eta-
squared values for each of our independent variables.12 The results of our analysis are presented in 
the online appendix Table B. Remarkably, the variable War disabled proves to have the most 
consistently sizeable effect on the votes for Croatia’s two principal electoral competitors. Its effect 
size is particularly notable when it comes to the vote for the HDZ, as it tops other variables in four 
out of five electoral cycles. Of the economic variables, only Unemployment exhibits modest signs of 
importance in the 2007, 2011, and 2015 elections. These figures notwithstanding, the implication of 
our analysis is clear: the legacy of war has the greatest overall effect on voting patterns in 
contemporary Croatia and this effect shows little indication of disappearing. The economy, on the 
other hand, matters, but nowhere nearly as much. And there is little sign that this is changing over 
time. 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
The war in Croatia did not only leave substantial portions of the country devastated. It also left its 
society deeply split, with the dividing line formed along the communities’ different experiences of 
the devastation. Our project has shown that those experiences have become embedded into 
political choices and that they demonstrate exceptional resilience even two decades after the war 
had ended. Due to the nature of the Croatian war and the fact that it was directly related to the 
country’s independence, we could consider this deep social and political rift to be a form of a nation-
building cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Evans & Whitefield, 1993). The analysis of the Croatian 
case has helped extend our understanding of cleavage formation in this region to the often-
neglected polities that experienced the trauma of armed conflict. Communities that suffered more in 
the war for Croatia’s independence tend to vote more for the party which took them into that 
independence and which led them throughout the war to ultimate victory. They probably do that for 
a variety of reasons: because the HDZ champions their interests through different policies, because 
of continuing politicization of the war for independence which resonates throughout communities 
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unevenly depending on their war pasts, or simply because, as survey research has shown, their 
inhabitants have turned toward nationalism. More research is needed to shed light on this 
interactive process of embedding conflict into political loyalties that connects individual voters, their 
communities, and the political elites. We have shown that in the Croatian case this process does 
exist, that it is strong and resilient, and that it has very real political consequences. 
 Our analysis is not without historical parallels. When societies go through traumatic 
experiences that divide them, those divisions often do remain embedded for decades or even 
centuries to come. The structure of the contemporary Chilean party system, for example, has been 
profoundly influenced by the cleavage between those who supported Pinochet’s authoritarian rule 
and those who opposed it (Torcal & Mainwaring, 2003). The rupture over the Anglo-Irish Treaty and 
the resulting Irish Civil War of 1922-1923 remain firmly embedded in the party system of the 
Republic of Ireland to this day. The pattern of voting in Poland remarkably follows the line of division 
between the previously German lands in the West and the rest of the country. This line today seems 
to demarcate the rift between Polska liberalna and Polska solidarna – two geographically, 
economically, and increasingly ideologically distinct camps (Jasiewicz, 2009). Our analysis shows not 
only that terminology similar to the one on “two Polands” could probably be used for Croatia as 
well, but also that the dividing line between Croatia’s two halves is based on the communities’ real 
experiences of the country’s war for independence. Violence and conflict have become entrenched 
into democratic political competition. They continue to burden the society and arguably prevent it 
from making a full recovery. 
 Can historical legacies such as this one recede into the past with the increasing influence of 
contemporary relations and institutions, as Kitschelt et al. (1999) noted in their magisterial study of 
early post-communist party systems? Not necessarily, or at least not necessarily very soon. As 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) perceptively observe, Lipset and Rokkan’s argument suggests 
that a political cleavage remains salient as long as the underlying issues have not been satisfactorily 
resolved. And, as Wittenberg (2006) has convincingly demonstrated in the case of Hungary, even 
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when those issues have been satisfactorily resolved, mass political loyalties can persist for decades 
to come. In the case of Croatia, the long-term impact of the end of the ICTY’s work on political 
competition remains to be seen. However, judging by the highly charged 2013-2015 conflicts 
between the SDP-led government and the veterans’ organizations over veterans’ benefits and the 
official use of Serb language and the Cyrillic script in the municipality of Vukovar – it seems local 
players will continue to mold political competition along familiar lines. Moreover, as our analysis has 
shown, economic conditions do seem to have an effect on voting patterns – but that effect is 
comparatively small, and it carries a danger of only compounding the problem. If an evolving 
economic cleavage begins to overlap the depressed areas of high unemployment with those that 
have been disproportionally devastated by war, this could carry a high risk of an extremely polarizing 
discourse of victimization spilling over into the economic sphere, and of political competition over 
the management of the economy being framed in terms of the legacy of war. Satisfactory resolution 
of the issues underlying a divisive nation-building cleavage then might not be possible for 
generations to come. 
  




                                                          
1 Such rhetoric was present throughout this whole period. See, for example, “Neizlazak na izbore – otvaranje 
puta ‘crvenima’,” Večernji list, 16.12.1999, 5; “Sanader: Govore ‘DA za Hrvatsku’ 12 godina poslije,” Večernji 
list, 10.11.2003, 4; “Bozanić: Ne glasajte za one koji blate Domovinski rat,” Jutarnji list, 5.11.2007, 2-3. “SDP će 
popis branitelja objaviti na internet,” Jutarnji list, 19.11.2007, 8-9.  
2 Kieschnick and McCullough (2003) compare a number of models that are generally used to estimate 
proportional data including, among others, the standard linear regression, a logit transformation of the 
dependent variable, and a censored Tobit model. They recommend either a parametric regression model with 
a beta distribution or a quasi-likelihood approach suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), depending on 
the distribution of the proportional variable, the size of sample (where beta regression is better for smaller 
samples), and whether or not it includes the extreme values of 0 and 1. We find that, according to the 
distribution of our dependent variable, the quasi-likelihood approach fits our model better. 
3 We tested several alternative linear models applying the Ramsey RESET specification test and have found 
that the linear regression model as well as models requiring a transformation of the dependent variable result 
in misrepresentation. Only the parametric beta distribution model and the fractional logit fit our CEF 
appropriately. In choosing between the two models, we use Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the similar 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). In both cases the fractional logit is a far better choice. We also tried panel 
data analysis with SE clustered by county, and in the final analysis got very similar results. We opted against it, 
however, because it disabled us from capturing the evolution of the foundations of electoral support across 
different electoral cycles. 
4 The only change of any real substance to the law came in 2015 when limited preferential voting was 
introduced. 
5 In spite of slight differences in the composition of the Center-Left Coalition across elections, we believe that 
its results are comparable because of stable (if at times quarrelsome) participation by the three core partners: 
Social Democratic Party (SDP), Croatian People’s Party (HNS), and the regional Istrian Democratic Assembly 
(IDS). 
6 Since the five elections were held on 3 January 2000, 23 November 2003, 25 November 2007, 4 December 
2011, and 8 November 2015 our election years are actually 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015. 
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7 Croatian government estimated the direct war damages at $50-80 billion, with additional $22 billion of 
indirect damages in lost economic activity. More than 10% of the housing stock was destroyed, and nearly 20% 
of the population – about 800,000 people – were exiled from their homes for some period of time during the 
war. The government also estimated the number of dead at 13,583 and wounded at 37,180 on the Croatian 
side (Vlada, 1998). 
8 To test this proposition, we looked at the results of Croatia’s first democratic election in 1990 – which were 
also the last pre-war elections. We matched the contemporary 556 municipalities to the 115 municipalities 
which were in place at the time of the 1990 election, and we compared the 1990 election results for the HDZ 
and the SDP predecessor League of Communists (SKH) with their results in 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015. 
The average correlation of the HDZ vote in 1990 with its votes in the five aforementioned electoral cycles was 
0.21. For the SDP/SKH it was even lower: 0.14. What is equally important, we correlated the HDZ and SKH 
results in 1990 with the war disability figures. We got a correlation of -0.01 for HDZ and War disabled and 0.17 
for SKH and War disabled. In our opinion, these values are sufficiently low to warrant our analysis and 
interpretations. 
9 It is likely that the results for the 2003 election are not significant due to a change in the methodology of 
measuring unemployment by the HZZ in that year, which may have led to a temporary and geographically 
uneven decline in standards of reporting. 
10 The Center-Left Coalition was promising budget cuts since the 1999 electoral campaign. See, for example, 
“Smanjit ćemo proračun 17 posto,” Večernji list, 16.12.1999, 4; “Vesna Pusić: HDZ je trebao zvati MMF. Ovako 
su nas upropastili,” Večernji list, 24.11.2011, 10-11.  
11 During the 2007 campaign, Croatian stock market actually took a substantial temporary hit due to the 
prospect of the Center-Left Coalition winning the election with its promise of instituting a capital gains tax. 
“Spriječen slom burze,” Večernji list, 21.11.2007, 2-3. 
12 Eta-squared can be defined as the proportion of total variation in the dependent variable attributed to an 
effect of a specific independent variable. The larger the value of Eta-squared, the larger the effect a particular 
variable carries, or in other words, the higher the variance attributed to that particular variable. Can be 
expressed as:    =
        
       
, where           is the sum of squares of the effect of interest, while          is the 
total sum of squares for all effects, interactions and errors in the ANOVA. The formula implies we needed to 
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use the standard OLS regression to calculate this effect. We felt confident doing that because the OLS results 
were nearly identical to the results of our fractional logit model. We also report partial Eta-squared because 
with Eta-squared the proportion explained by a particular variable decreases as more variables are added to 
the model, making it difficult to compare the effect of a variable across samples. Partial Eta-squared solves this 
problem by including the unexplained variation in the dependent variable (the error variance attributed to the 
effect) plus the variation explained by the independent variable instead of the total variation in the dependent 
variable – meaning that any variation explained by other independent variables is removed from the 




, where          is the error variance attributed 
to the effect of interest. 
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Table 1. Determinants of support for the HDZ and the Center-Left Coalition 
 
 
2000 2003 2007 2011 2015 











































































































































































































































































































Observations 541 541 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 
Log pseudolikelihood -213.2 -237.5 -228.7 -228.5 -229.7 -222.8 -218.5 -230.7 -229.4 -220.8 
R-squared 0.574 0.713 0.701 0.665 0.650 0.719 0.661 0.682 0.705 0.749 
LR test 19.57* 37.65*** 37.74*** 29.18*** 37.1*** 52.69*** 36.27*** 33.18*** 43.74*** 43.61*** 
***p<0.01. **p<0.05. *p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Fractional logit used throughout. 





Sources: Croatia’s Electoral Commission (DIP), Croatian Employment Service (HZZ), Tax Administration (Porezna 
uprava), and the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (DZS). 
Figure 2. 








Vote share for the HDZ list on the municipal level. In 2011, the HDZ in some electoral 
districts ran together with two minor parties – Croatian Citizens’ Party (HGS) and the 
Democratic Center (DC). The vote share of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) in that election 
was also added to their tally because they participated in the outgoing HDZ government 
and agreed to post-electoral coalition. In 2015, the HDZ formed a pre-electoral coalition 
(“The Patriotic Coalition”) together with seven minor rightist parties. 1 
Coalition 
Vote share for the Center-Left Coalition led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) on the 
municipal level. In 2000, it consisted of two electoral lists: SDP-HSLS and the 4+ coalition of 
the HSS, IDS, HNS, and LS. In 2003, vote totals for the SDP coalition (SDP, IDS, LS, Libra) 
were tallied together with the other parties of the ruling coalition (HNS, HSS). In 2007, vote 
totals for the SDP were tallied together with those for the HNS and IDS because they 
agreed to post-electoral coalition. In 2011, SDP formed a pre-electoral coalition (“Kukuriku 
Coalition”) with the HNS, IDS, and HSU. In 2015, the SDP formed a pre-electoral coalition 
(“Croatia Is Growing”) with the HNS, HSU, and several minor parties of the center-left. 
Their vote total was tallied together with the vote total for the IDS because they agreed to 
post-electoral coalition prior to the election. 1 
Unemployment Average monthly unemployment rate in electoral year 2, 3 
Income (log) Income per capita in electoral year (deflated to 2010 levels), natural log transformed 3, 4 
Income Δ Annual change in income per capita in electoral year 3, 4 
War disabled 
Number of disabled per ‘000 whose cause of disability was the 1991-1995 war for 
independence 4 
Croats Proportion of population ethnically Croat 4 
Non-believers Proportion of population declared as atheist, agnostic, or non-religious 4 
Active Proportion of population economically active 4 
Retirees Proportion of population officially retired 3, 4 
Agriculture Proportion of population with primary source of income from agriculture 4 
Average age Average years of age of population 4 
Education Average years of education for population older than 15 years of age 4 
Settlement size (log) Average weighted settlement size in municipality, natural log transformed 4 
Dalmatia = 1 if municipality in Dalmatia (n=131); = 0 otherwise 
Slavonia = 1 if municipality in Slavonia (n=127); = 0 otherwise 
Istria = 1 if municipality in Istria (n=47); = 0 otherwise 
Sources: 1 Croatia’s Electoral Commission; 2 Croatian Employment Service (HZZ); 3 Tax Authority; 4 Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics 
 
Note on the variable Settlement size (log): Taking the log of a full population of a given municipality as a proxy 
measure for the possible rural-urban cleavage would not be methodologically sound because the full population of a 
given municipality is most often not a good measure of its rural or urban status. This is why Settlement size (log) 
actually represents the log of the average weighted settlement size in a given municipality: 
 









where     is the population of a settlement   and   is the number of settlements in a given municipality. This measure, 




Appendix Table B. Effect size estimates 
 
 
2000 2003 2007 2011 2015 












































































































































































































































































































Table reports η2 and partial η2 (in parentheses). 
 
 
